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1ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to review Fiji’s macroeconomic performance and
assess the relative significance of foreign exchange, domestic savings, and public sector
resources on Fiji’s economic growth by formulating and estimating a simple three-gap
model.  The estimated foreign exchange gap equation indicates a sharp trade-off be-
tween investment, or capacity creation, and capacity utilization.  The government sav-
ings constraint also appears to be binding.  The model is then simulated for the period
between 1997 and 2001 under four growth path ‘scenarios’ that make differing as-
sumptions concerning Fiji’s output, exports and capital flows.  The results suggest that
the external financing required to achieve a ‘socially desirable’ growth path is modest,
amounting to an average of 17.5 per cent of potential output.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Following a decade of relatively high rates of economic growth during the
1970s, Fiji’s economic performance declined considerably in the 1980s.  Economic
growth both slowed down and became increasingly erratic, and for many policy makers
it appeared that the country’s decade-old experience with an inward-looking import-
substituting industrialization strategy had reached its limits.  In an effort to restore eco-
nomic growth Fiji embarked upon an orthodox structural adjustment programme that
sought, among other things, to redirect industrial policy towards export-led growth
while pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, external trade liberalization, and internal
de-regulation, including changes in agricultural markets, public sector restructuring,
and financial sector reform (Akram-Lodhi, 1996; Elek, Hill and Tabor, 1993).  While
the adjustment program was apparently successful, to the extent that it reversed the de-
cline in the trend rate of growth of output, diversified exports, and restored macroeco-
nomic balances, it fell short of policy makers’ expectations in other aspects.  The ad-
justment programme did little to reverse the declining trend in the rate of growth of in-
vestment, failed to achieve a reasonably high rate of growth of output, and did little to
spur a generalized increase in job creation.
While Fiji’s economic difficulties and their causes have been studied, these
studies have been mainly descriptive; no recent attempt has been made to quantify the
main constraints upon economic growth in Fiji.  This article addresses this shortcom-
ing.  It assesses the role and significance of domestic private and public sector savings,
as well as foreign savings, on the growth path of output by formulating and estimating a
simple structural three-gap model of growth similar to that suggested by Bacha (1990)
and Taylor (1991).  According to the three-gap model, the utilization and growth of
productive capacity is constrained not only by domestic and foreign savings, as was
initially discussed by Chenery and Strout (1966) in the context of the two-gap model,
but also by the availability of public sector resources.  There can be little doubt that
public sector resources have played a crucial role in the economy of independent Fiji.
Public sector savings and investment have been vital in determining the productive ca-
pacity of the economy and its growth rate, both directly through public enterprises and
indirectly through investment in physical, social and human infrastructure.  Therefore,
this article estimates a three-gap model for the period 1971 to 1996.  The estimation
results are then used to conduct simulations of the period between 1997 to 2001.  Four
distinctive policy simulations are conducted.  These simulations assess the impact of a
2gradual elimination of Fiji’s preferential access to the European Union (EU) for its
sugar exports as well as the amount of foreign resources that would be needed if Fiji
were to achieve a socially desirable growth rate.
Following this introduction, Section II provides an overview of the evolution of
Fiji’s economy during the post-independence period.  Particular emphasis is placed on
changes occurring during the period between 1987 to 1992, when structural adjustment
became ‘embedded’ within the economic policy of the government.  In Section III the
three-gap model is specified and estimated, using annual data for the period between
1971 and 1996.  Using the parameter estimates of the model, Section IV provides the
results of four policy simulations and examines the impact of the availability of foreign
financing, domestic savings and public sector resources on the growth path of the Fiji
economy.  Conclusions are presented in Section V.
2. THE ECONOMY OF FIJI, 1970-1998
Table 1 in the Appendix provides a summary of the major macroeconomic indi-
cators during four main periods:  the first post-independence decade, 1971 to 1981; the
crisis period of 1982 to 1986; the adjustment period under the Interim Government
(1989-1992)ii; and the most recent period of 1993 to 1996.  In what follows develop-
ments in the main macroeconomic indicators, and the underlying policy changes sur-
rounding such developments, are examined.
i. Economic policy and performance, 1970-1981iii
Fiji inherited a colonial economic structure which changed little in the decade
after independence in 1970, as the government pursued a development strategy based
upon seeking to secure full employment through the continued use of the country’s
natural resources.  In seeking to exploit the country’s natural resources, the government
pursued a labour-intensive development strategy designed to both sustain economic op-
portunities and, more particularly, maintain communal relations between the indigenous
Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities, who together comprised most of the population.  In
this light, it can be said that ethnic relationships have had a major impact upon the eco-
nomic development of Fiji.
As in the pre-independence period, agriculture continued to be the major eco-
nomic activity following independence, accounting, as Table 1 illustrates, for over 25
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the period 1971 to 1981.  Indeed, since
31970 agriculture has accounted for between 20 and 25 percent of GDP.  In 1996, agri-
culture provided almost a fifth of Fiji’s GDP and employed, on a full-time or a part-
time basis, more than 75 per cent of all households.  Within agriculture, sugarcane con-
tinues to be the dominant crop.  As late as 1996 sugar production accounted for over 12
percent of GDP, more than 40 per cent of the agricultural sector, 30 per cent of the
manufacturing sector, and provided direct employment for more than 25 per cent of the
country’s economically active population (Fiji Bureau of Statistics, various issues:  Ta-
ble 3.3).  As Table 1 shows, in 1996 the sugar industry provided about 40 per cent of
exports by value.  Granted, the importance of the sugar sector has declined as inde-
pendent Fiji has diversified its economic activities; for example, other significant natu-
ral resource-based activities currently include tourism, gold, fisheries, and timber.
Nonetheless, sugar production still plays a critical role in the performance of the overall
economy.  The complex ethnic dimension that has shaped Fiji’s political economy is
particularly witnessed in the sugar sector because, as will be seen, the ownership of land
resides within the indigenous Fijian community and the production of sugar resides
largely within the Indo-Fijian community (Akram-Lodhi, 1997).
In theory, Fiji’s sugar industry has been subject to the dictates of the interna-
tional economy.  However, in practice the impact of international economic conditions
on Fiji’s sugar industry has been muted because of quota arrangements with the EU.
The Sugar Protocol agreed between the then European Economic Community (EEC)
and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries came into force in 1975 under the aus-
pices of Protocol 3 of the Lomé Convention (Prasad and Akram-Lodhi, 1998).  The
Sugar Protocol committed Fiji to delivering specific quantities of sugar to the EEC at
prices which were guaranteed and which were based upon the price of sugar set annu-
ally under the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy.  In 1975 Fiji was allocated a quota
of 163600 metric tons of sugar, equivalent to 13.4 per cent of the total preferential
quota.  For the period 1990 to 1992 Fiji’s quota allocation amounted to an average of
42 per cent of the country’s total sugar production and 46.6 per cent of the country's
total sugar exports (MacDonald, 1996).  Fiji received a price which not only averaged
between 2.5 and 3 times the world market price but which was also significantly more
stable than the world market price (Hermann and Weiss, 1995).
In contrast to natural resource-based economic activities, the manufacturing
sector has been small in size and subordinate in terms of its economic importance.  The
limited industrial development that occurred during the first post-independence decade
4was largely based upon import-substitution, which protected domestic industries
through a complex regulatory regime deploying quota, license and tariff protection.
Thus, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP rose slightly from less than 11 percent
at the time of independence to about 13 percent by the end of first post-independence
decade.  The lower priority attached to industrialization partly reflected the widely
shared view that very small economies have only a limited potential for industrializa-
tion.  It also reflected an emphasis on employment-generating labour-intensive activi-
ties as a means of maintaining communal relations.
However, despite trade barriers the economy always had a comparatively high
degree of openness to the international economy.  Fiji relied upon a vast range of im-
ported consumption, intermediate and capital goods to meet the demands of consumers
and firms.  Thus, in the period between 1971 and 1981, imports accounted for about 57
percent of GDP, exports for almost half of GDP, and net exports, as shown in Table 1,
for -7.4 per cent of GDP.  Post-colonial Fiji was therefore a hybrid:  an economy with
elements of dirigisme which was nonetheless deeply insinuated into the world economy
(Narayan, 1984).
State regulation was not confined to external trade.  Indeed, it can be argued that
the most important intervention by the government was the regulation of factor and
product markets within the economy.  A Prices and Incomes Board (PIB) was estab-
lished to monitor and control the wholesale and retail prices of many goods and some
services.  In addition to the PIB, several ministries, including the present Ministries of
Tourism and Transport, Works and Energy, Commerce, Business Development and
Investment, Public Enterprises, and Labour and Industrial Relations, and several quasi-
autonomous government institutions like the Native Land Trust Board and the Fijian
Affairs Board, were empowered to regulate product and factor markets, including land
and labour.  The post-colonial government also exercised considerable power over pro-
ductive activity, both directly, by establishing public enterprises in agriculture, manu-
facturing, and services, as well as indirectly, by planning and setting production targets.
Finally, the state intervened heavily in financial markets:  interest rates were controlled,
and the exchange rate was fixed.
ii. Economic crisis, 1982-1986
Table 1 demonstrates that overall economic performance, as measured by the
rate of growth of GDP, has varied considerably since 1970.  In the first decade follow-
5ing independence, economic performance was generally good, as Fiji witnessed real
GDP growth of 5.2 per cent per year and removed ‘some of the worst elements of the
colonial inheritance’ (Cameron, 1994: 420).  However, this performance was not sus-
tained through the first half of the 1980s.  In the early 1980s ‘Fiji was undergoing a
multi-dimensional crisis’ (Cameron, 1994: 420) consisting of drought, cyclones, the
1979 oil price rise, and unexpected turbulence in international sugar prices.  As a con-
sequence, real GDP growth dropped to 1.2 percent per annum during the period be-
tween 1982 and 1986; over the same period, real per capita GDP contracted by 0.7 per
cent per year.  As might be expected, the stagnation of output was accompanied by in-
creasing fiscal imbalance:  the fiscal deficit rose from 5.3 percent of GDP during the
period between 1971 and 1981 to 6.1 percent during the period between 1982 to 1986.
Foreign debt also continued to grow. As Table 1 indicates, foreign debt as a percentage
of gross national product (GNP) rose from 28.6 per cent at the end of 1982 to 32.4 per
cent by the end of 1986.
In light of what was clearly an economic crisis, in late 1986 the Finance Minis-
ter outlined the beginning of a change in Fiji’s industrial policy by announcing the
creation of tax-free factories, a form of export-processing zone (Akram-Lodhi, 1992).
This initiative was meant to be a first, albeit decisive, step in a shift in industrial policy
away from import-substitution and towards export promotion, a shift which had an ex-
tremely long gestation period, having been first mooted in Development Plan 6 pub-
lished in 1970 (Chandra, 1985).  However, the 1986 shift in industrial policy became a
much deeper transformation in economic strategy in the wake of two coups led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka in May and September 1987.
The 1987 coups were a severe economic shock.  Tourism dropped by some 36
per cent, while farmers disrupted the sugar cane harvest in protest. The cessation of
concessional credit, a sharp fall in inflows of foreign direct investment, and the flight of
an estimated F$120 million (US$83 million) out of the country in 1987 and 1988 all
reduced considerably the availability of foreign financial resources and hence imports.
Given that some 40 per cent of budget revenues came from customs and excise, the im-
pact of the coups was quickly experienced by government:  between 1986 and 1987 the
budget deficit increased by over 12.5 per cent, to stand at almost 8 per cent of GDP.  It
was partly in response to the deepening crisis that the newly-appointed, military-backed
Interim Government ‘pinpointed industrialization as being of prime importance to Fiji’s
6future development’ (Chandra, 1989: 170) in that it could both stabilize and indeed ex-
pand the economy, and thus act to offset possible political unrest.
iii. Embedding structural adjustment, 1987-1992
In transforming economic strategy the Interim Government was not only
claiming to respond to the higher costs, excess capacity and resource misallocation as-
sociated with Fiji’s attempt at import-substitution, problems initially identified in the
government’s review of Development Plan 7 (Fiji Ministry of Finance Central Planning
Office, 1979).  It was also ‘responding both to the international trend towards economic
liberalization and export-oriented industrialization and to specific advice from its con-
sultants and international agencies’ (Chandra, 1989: 170).  This advice had argued that
Fiji needed to radically improve its export potential by reducing unit labour costs if it
was to continue to grow (World Bank, 1986; Fiji Employment and Development Mis-
sion, 1984).  Given that much of this advice had been received prior to the coups, and
given that the initial creation of tax-free factories predated the coups, the transforma-
tion in Fiji’s economic strategy that occurred after 1987 should not so much be seen as
a dramatic break with the past as rather a confirmation of policy processes which had
already been initiated prior to the coupsiv.
The central themes in Fiji’s transformation of economic strategy were embed-
ded in the formulation and implementation of an orthodox structural adjustment pro-
gramme that by and large shared many features of World Bank and International
Monetary Fund-sponsored programmes.  The important exception to this rule was that
Fiji received no financial transfers from either multilateral institution in exchange for
initiating the programme.  The adjustment programme aimed at a far reaching eco-
nomic change through macroeconomic stabilization, external trade liberalization and
internal deregulation, including changes in agricultural markets, public sector restruc-
turing, and financial sector reforms.  These policy reforms were to facilitate economic
restructuring and transform Fiji from an ‘inward looking, high tax, and slow growth
economy to a dynamic outward looking, low tax and high growth economy’ (Fiji Min-
istry of Finance, 1991).
a. Macroeconomic stabilization
The increase in the budget deficit brought about by the collapse in tourism and
the disruption of the sugar cane harvest necessitated the stabilization of the economy.
7The government did this by implementing deflationary fiscal and monetary policies.
On the fiscal side, the government imposed a 15 per cent wage cut on all civil servants.
It also slashed public investment in real terms by a third.  On the monetary side, the
central bank, the Reserve Bank of Fiji, severely restricted the availability of private
sector credit and imposed additional restrictions on outflows of foreign exchange.
However, undoubtedly the most important component of the Interim Govern-
ment's stabilization package was a devaluation of the Fiji dollar (Akram-Lodhi, 1996).
The value of the Fiji dollar is fixed by the Reserve Bank relative to a weighted basket
of the currencies of Fiji's principal trading partners.  A two-stage devaluation in June
and October 1987 reduced the value of the dollar in nominal terms by some 33 per cent.
When combined with the decline in real wages the impact was to bring about a fall in
the real effective exchange rate of almost 28 per cent in the period between 1986 and
1988.  The effect was to reduce further the attractiveness of capital flight and improve
the competitive position of the economy by reversing the decline in output and invest-
ment caused by the coups.
However, the government did not stop at stabilization.  It used economic crisis
to cement macroeconomic reform by restructuring Fiji’s fiscal stance.  In the 1990
budget the Finance Minister felt confident enough to cut income tax rates by 20 per
cent, leaving the highest rate at 40 per cent.  At the same time exemptions and allow-
ances were increased.  To compensate for the loss of revenue and to ease the transition
to a new value-added tax existing indirect taxes were raised and the tax base was
broadened by bringing some 40000 peasants into income tax for the first time.  Plans to
‘corporatize’ several state-owned enterprises also moved forward.  While this effort to
force state-owned enterprises to follow commercial practices was envisaged to be a
prelude to privatization, the more immediate positive impact from the government’s
point of view was on its own accounts.
In the Interim Government’s final 1992 budget further cuts in income tax and
corporation tax were announced; the number of income tax bands was reduced; corpo-
ration tax was simplified; income tax thresholds were increased; and the requirement
that those below the threshold pay tax was ended.  Finally, despite the resignation of
the Interim Government prior to the May 1992 election a key policy initiative, the
much-debated value-added tax, was introduced on schedule in July by the newly
elected government.
8b. Trade liberalization
The most visible aspect of the Interim Government's adjustment programme
was that of external trade liberalization.  Tax-free factories quickly became an impor-
tant feature of Fiji’s industrial and export policy (Akram-Lodhi, 1992).  Tax-free facto-
ries received substantial tax concessions in exchange for a commitment to export 95 per
cent of output.  Such concessions were available to both Fiji and international firms,
thus placing both within a similar regulatory regime.  Of the 119 firms engaged in tax-
free manufacturing by the end of 1992, 70 per cent were in garment production.  De-
spite the fact that garments exports had started to increase prior to the introduction of
tax-free factories, the performance of the garments factories was impressive:  by 1990
garments production for export comprised over 55 per cent of manufacturing produc-
tion, over 22 per cent of total domestic exports, and over 37 per cent of all manufac-
turing employment (Akram-Lodhi, 1992; Elek, Hill and Tabor, 1993).  Almost half of
those firms operating tax-free factories in 1992 were transnational corporations, albeit
from a narrow group of countries.  Economic changes in Australia and New Zealand in
particular forced garment producers from those countries to seek to source production
offshore in countries such as Fiji.  In order to attract such businesses, the Interim Gov-
ernment eased and simplified approval procedures for foreign direct investment while
at the same time expanding the resources available to the Fiji Trade and Investment
Board so that it could enhance its capacity to attract foreign direct investment.  Thus,
the share of foreign direct investment in GDP was 27 per cent higher under the adjust-
ment period of 1989 to 1992 as compared to that of the immediate pre-adjustment pe-
riod of 1982 to 1986.  The increase in international investment flows directed into Fiji
might be taken to be a sign of confidence in the irreversible nature of the change in Fiji
towards a liberal, export-oriented economic regime.  It also indicates the extent to
which trade and investment are complementary phenomena.
As regards imports, external trade liberalization has meant an effective end to
import licensing.  The licensing regime used to sustain import substitution was largely
eradicated as Fiji switched to an open general license scheme covering most consump-
tion, intermediate and capital goods.  Thus, prior to 1989 over 47 commodities required
licenses; in 1991, only 9 commodities required licenses (Elek, Hill and Tabor, 1993).
The government replaced import licensing with a simplified structure of tariffs.  Maxi-
mum tariff levels were progressively cut, so that by 1992 most imports had attached to
them a fiscal duty of 30 per cent.  Indeed, the last budget of the Interim Government
9held out the prospect of a maximum tariff of only 20 per cent in 1993, in part due to the
introduction of a value-added tax designed to assist in reducing the dependence of
revenue upon customs levies.
c. Internal deregulation
External trade liberalization was accompanied by extensive internal deregula-
tion.  The overall thrust of the changes involved a reduction in barriers to entry in do-
mestic markets, thereby potentially enhancing competitive discipline.  Obviously, the
shift to an open general license scheme was an important component of a reduction in
barriers to entry.  So too was the reduction and simplification of customs duties and
corporation tax.  However, internal deregulation went further than these obvious
changes. Detailed sectoral economic targeting was eliminated after the coups.  This re-
duced the non-market, linkage-enhancing planning requirements that had been placed
upon some firms.  An enhancement of the role of markets was furthered by the elimi-
nation of price controls on a range of items.  Indeed, the need for price controls was to
some extent eliminated by the introduction of enforceable trading standards by the
Ministry of Trade and Commerce in the last year of the Interim Government.
Barriers to market entry were further diminished by attempts at reforming state-
owned enterprises.  Under the auspices of the Public Enterprise Unit in the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, the government corporatized several large public en-
terprises.  This placed some state-owned enterprises on the same legal and commercial
basis as private sector firms, with the government theoretically committed to simply
acting as the majority shareholder.  Corporatization led some firms to conduct effi-
ciency-enhancing internal reforms.  At the same time, the process did in theory open up
protected markets to competition.  However, only one seriously unprofitable firm was
closed, while industrial action in several corporatized companies resulted in the kind of
government intervention that corporatization was supposed to prevent.
The final major internal deregulation initiative of the Interim Government was
to enhance the flexibility of the labour market.  In 1991 statutory wage guidelines were
abolished in order to strengthen the position of employers in establishing the relation-
ship between pay and productivity.  This was followed by changes to labour legislation,
which substantially increased government intervention in the internal affairs of unions.
The effect of these changes to labour legislation was to make it less likely that the 80
per cent of the formally employed labour force which belonged to trades unions, pro-
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fessional associations or other, similar, organizations would assert their right to with-
draw their labour.
There can be no doubt concerning the impressive stabilization of the economy
in the period following the coups.  Although real per capita GDP shrank by over 7 per
cent in 1987 and inflation peaked at 12 per cent in November 1988, by mid-1988 the
economy was recovering.  As demonstrated in Table 1, the economy grew at an average
annual rate of 5.5 percent over the period between 1989 and 1992, fiscal deficits were
reduced to 4.4 percent of GDP, and net exports turned positive for the first time.  Re-
covery was fuelled by higher sugar export earnings and by a gradual expansion of pri-
vate sector credit.  The recovery of the sugar sector was accompanied by a return of
tourists; thus, government revenues increased.  Buoyant government revenues permit-
ted 1987 public sector wage cuts to be restored in real terms in 1988 and 1989.  At the
same time, higher earnings from sugar exports and tourism, combined with higher ex-
port earnings from garments and increasing foreign direct investment, helped to raise
foreign reserves and reduce foreign debt.  Net foreign direct investment increased from
US$6.3 million in 1987 to an average annual net inflow of US$43 million during the
period between 1989 and 1992.
While the structural adjustment programme of 1987 to 1992 was quite instru-
mental in restoring economic growth, it did little to reverse the decline in the trend rate
of growth of investment, and particularly private investment.  As Table 1 indicates, the
share of fixed investment in GDP declined from 23 per cent during the period 1971 to
1982 to just under 15 per cent during the period 1989 to 1992.  Indeed, it dropped to as
low as 12.1 per cent in 1996.  Private investment as a percentage of GDP almost
halved, dropping from its peak value of 14 per cent during the period 1977 to 1981 to
7.4 per cent during the period 1987 to 1992.  The economic crisis of the early 1980s,
combined with fiscal restraints during the adjustment period, growing uncertainty over
property rights in land, and the future direction of government policy reforms, put se-
vere constraints upon the growth of investment.
iv. Economic policy under Rabuka, 1993-1998
In 1992 elections were held under the provisions of the discriminatory 1990
Constitution.  Rabuka, the leader of the coups and now a Major General, became Prime
Minister at the head of a Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei-General Voters’ Party
coalition government. Under Rabuka’s leadership the explicit commitment to structural
11
adjustment did not change; economic policy remained committed to macroeconomic
stabilization, external trade liberalization, and internal trade deregulation.  Nonetheless,
the exigencies of electoral politics--however flawed--meant that the context had cer-
tainly shifted.  While policy reform continued, the pace of reform slowed.  Moreover,
the impact of fluctuating fortunes in the sugar and tourism sectors sustained continued
efforts by the government to diversify the pattern of economic activity, especially
through the encouragement of manufacturing.
As demonstrated in Table 1, between 1993 and 1996 the economy grew at an
annual average rate of 2.8 per cent--much less than that achieved in the decade follow-
ing independence.  As they had since the mid-1980s, sugar, garment manufacturing and
tourism dominated economic performance between 1993 and 1996.  Sugar was respon-
sible for 42 per cent of agricultural production in 1996.  Moreover, as shown in Table
1, between 1993 and 1996 sugar comprised over 39 per cent of total exports.  At the
same time, the redirection of industrial strategy towards export-led growth in mid-
1980s led to a steady increase in manufacturing’s contribution to GDP.  As Table 1 in-
dicates, by 1996 manufacturing accounted for almost 15 percent of GDP.  While sugar
remained responsible for 22.4 per cent of manufacturing production in 1996, the sector
was in fact dominated by garment production for export in 120 tax-free factories, which
in 1997 were responsible for two-thirds of all manufacturing employment.  Garment
exports increased from 4.1 per cent of total exports in 1986 to 23.1 per cent of total ex-
ports in 1996.  Indeed, the efforts of successive governments to transform Fiji into an
export-oriented economy were, by the late 1990s, clearly successful.  Exports went
from 16.2 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 28.2 per cent of GDP in 1994.  As demonstrated
in Table 1, sugar and garments between them were responsible for over 60 per cent of
all merchandise exports in 1996, and well over 60000 jobs.  Tourism, which provided
around 20 per cent of GDP in 1996, also made an important contribution to net exports.
The steady improvement in trade balances during the early 1990s led net exports, which
had been in deficit for most of the post-colonial period, to move into surplus.  The im-
provement in the trade balances helped to restore foreign reserves, which in 1997 stood
at US$347 million, and reduce foreign debt.  As Table 1 indicates, total foreign debt
dropped from an average of 21.4 per cent of GNP in 1992 period to 14 per cent in 1995.
Inflation, which in Fiji is mainly determined by import prices and the exchange rate,
was also significantly cut, averaging 2.8 per cent between 1993 and 1996.
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However, as Table 1 shows, the public finances of low growth, export-driven
Fiji were not particularly strong between 1993 and 1996.  The government ran consis-
tent budget deficits, which over the period between 1993 and 1996 averaged 4.9 per
cent of GDP.  Moreover, while the public finances did begin to improve in 1994 and
1995, as illustrated in Table 1, it was subsequently discovered that the state-owned Na-
tional Bank of Fiji (NBF), the largest domestic commercial bank, had, as a consequence
of financial mismanagement and possible corruption, accumulated bad debts of more
than F$200 million (US$143 million) and was near to collapse.  In order to restructure
the NBF the government was forced to give it an F$213.3 million (US$152 million)
injection of capital.  The impact of the rescue of the NBF on the budget deficit was
enormous:  the budget deficit reached an unsustainable 9.2 per cent of GDP in 1997, of
which over 12.3 per cent was a direct result of the rescue.
At the same time, consistent budget deficits had other, less contingent, causes.
A first factor was that the government had to meet accumulated debt repayment obliga-
tions.  In 1996 accumulated debt repayments accounted for 16 per cent of government
spending and over the period between 1993 and 1996 debt repayments often exceeded
the size of the budget deficit.  Nonetheless, the strength of exports implied that the debt
burden, while heavy, was manageable:  the debt-service ratio fell from 11.2 per cent in
1991 to 5.9 per cent in 1995.
A second factor was that the government was continuing to restructure its tools
of revenue acquisition.  In order to boost domestic competitiveness, the government
sought to reform pricing in water, power and telecommunications utilities.  In order to
boost international competitiveness, increase simplicity and transparency, and in order
to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) non-discretionary policies, the 1998
budget reviewed the tariff structure.  Tariffs were cut on many imported non-locally
produced goods.  Some 97 non-locally produced goods were subjected to a new tariff
of 10 per cent, while some goods were moved onto a zero-tariff band.  For those im-
ported goods that competed with locally produced goods, tariffs were increased to 35
per cent.  However, such a tariff fell within the WTO bound rate of 40 per cent.
Moreover, it was promised that tariffs for imported goods that competed with locally
produced goods would fall by 3 per cent a year every year to 2002.
Fiscal weakness also contributed to budgetary deficits.  Privatization proceeds
had been expected during the 1990s to improve the public finances.  However, the first
privatization attempted by the government, that of the Government Shipyard, was a
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mess.  One of the partners in the buyout went into receivership and government had to
spend time and money searching for a new partner.  At the same time, attempts to speed
up privatization required large budgetary outlays in order to meet the initial expenses of
reorganizing corporatized state-owned enterprises and in order to locate possible pur-
chasers of the assets.
Fiscal weakness was exacerbated by tax non-compliance.  The Finance Minister
in the 1998 budget estimated that some 13 per cent of government revenue were lost
due to non-compliance.  In part, non-compliance may have been a result of corruption
as, in addition to the NBF scandal, in 1997 the police had launched corruption probes
into the Customs Department, the Companies Office, the Registrar-General’s Depart-
ment, and the Fiji Housing Authority.  There can be little doubt that the perception that
corruption in Fiji was becoming both wider and deeper was at least in part responsible
for the Finance Minister’s 1998 decision to set up an autonomous and independent Fiji
Revenue and Customs Authority.
Within the context of a low growth, export-driven, fiscally weak economy, the
government relied heavily upon monetary policy.  Between 1993 and 1996 the Reserve
Bank raised the rate of growth of the M1 measure of the money supply considerably, to
11 per cent per annum, well above the 4 per cent rate of growth of the money supply
between 1989 and 1992 and well above the 5.6 per cent per annum nominal rate of
growth of the economy.  However, unlike 1988, when an easing of monetary policy
contributed to expansion, monetary policy failed to sustain an increase in the rate of
growth of output.  The government could not sustain the unsustainable, and in January
1998 the most important shift in monetary policy of the decade occurred when the Re-
serve Bank devalued the Fiji dollar by 20 per cent.  Ostensibly, the basis of the decision
to devalue was the need to mount a defensive reaction to the East Asian crisis, which
had led to substantial depreciations in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and
the Philippines.  In the wake of these depreciations, Fiji’s two largest trading partners,
Australia and New Zealand, had seen their currencies depreciate.  In Fiji’s low growth,
import-dependent, export-driven economy, the relative appreciation of the Fiji dollar
against the currencies of the country’s two largest trading partners meant a loss of com-
petitiveness and a reduced capacity to export.  This had the potential to dramatically de-
stabilize the economy.  At the same time, movements in the gold price had worked
against the economy.
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Nonetheless, it was clear that devaluation in and of itself would not resolve the
weaknesses of the Fiji economy in the short- and medium-term.  Both exports and im-
ports are very insensitive to changes in relative prices:  price elasticities of the demand
for exports and imports are estimated to be as low as -0.44 and -0.27, respectively
(Reddy, 1997: tables 1 and 2).  Fiji’s import dependence must severely restrict the
benefits of devaluation.  Moreover, in those sectors where Fiji directly competes with
East Asian countries and companies, the devaluation is, in many instances, less than the
depreciation of their currencies, meaning that Fiji after the devaluation has still has lost
a competitive advantage.  This applies particularly to garments and tourism.
Although per capita income grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 and 1.4 per
cent during the periods 1989 to 1992 and 1993 to 1996, respectively, the benefits of
growth were not equitably distributed.  It is estimated that 25 per cent of Fiji’s house-
holds in general and 32.8 per cent of urban households in particular lived in poverty in
1990.  Moreover, the proportion of the population in poverty between 1977 and 1990
increased by about 10 percentage points amongst households overall, and by 21 per-
centage points amongst urban households (Prasad and Asafu-Adjaye, 1998).  Accord-
ing to the United Nations Development Programme, this situation had deteriorated by
1996, especially as a result of rapid food price rises, rises which will accelerate in the
wake of the 1998 devaluation (United Nations Development Programme/Government
of Fiji, 1997).  Other indicators of income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also
show a worsening of income distribution.  The estimated Gini coefficient for Fiji sug-
gests that, nationally, income inequality deteriorated by about 10 percentage points
between 1990 and 1997 for households overall, and by as much as 19 percentage points
for urban households (Prasad and Asafu-Adjaye, 1998).  Moreover, as illustrated in Ta-
ble 1, mean daily real wages in ‘all industries’ declined from an average of F$12.40
during the period between 1982 and 1986 to F$9.70 during the period between 1989
and 1992.  The decline in real wages was consistent over the entire period between
1982 and 1992.  It was more pronounced in the manufacturing sector, where mean daily
real wages declined from an average of F$12.52 in the period between 1982 to 1986 to
an average of F$8.40 in the period between 1993 and 1994, a decline of 33 per cent.
Stagnant real wages sit alongside poor employment prospects for many.  By the year
2000, 11000 annual entrants onto the labour market will be chasing 5000 annually cre-
ated new jobs.  Clearly, the current situation is a recipe for social conflict that can only
be averted by job-creating, demand-enhancing investment.
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Yet, as Table 1 indicates, investment continued its trend decline between 1993
and 1996, dropping to as low as 12.1 per cent of GDP in 1996.  The government, in the
wake of low levels of investment, explicitly sought to increase foreign direct invest-
ment, usually through the deployment of tax concessions.  This was especially so in the
tax-free factories, where 120 factories were responsible for two-thirds of all manufac-
turing employment and 23 per cent of exports.  However, the impact of the tax-free
factories on the Fiji economy is reduced by leakages:  half of all garment exports go to
Australia, but non-labour inputs into garment production come from Australia.  The
result is that for some garment exports Australian content may reach 67 per cent of the
product’s value.  Net exports from garments are therefore low.  Fiji has been seeking
revisions to the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement’s
(SPARTECA) rules of origin, which dictate 50 per cent local content.  It has long been
realized that the rules of origin discourage efficiency improvements by discouraging
investment (Akram-Lodhi, 1992).
Tax concessions have also been used to little effect in the tourist industry.  The
government’s most recent policy package was designed to increase the stock of five-
star hotels in the country.  To that end, investors were offered a 20-year corporate in-
come tax holiday, the duty free entry of all capital goods, other concessions, and the
option to sell privately-generated electricity to the national grid.  The impact on in-
vestment has however been limited.  Tax concessions have also been used in the timber
industry, but although it has became an important export earner, in producing exports
one-seventh the value of those generated by sugar, it has been, to policy makers, a dis-
appointment.  The only sector where investment has been increasing has been in gold
production, in which Emperor Gold Mines has expanded even as Pacific Island Gold
has begun operating the new Mount Kasi mine.  Gold generated 9.9 per cent of exports
in 1996.  However, the recent slump in the world gold price will affect further invest-
ment.  Moreover, the scope for expansion is clearly limited.
The current policy of granting concessions to investors has thus proven to be in-
effective in boosting investment.  Moreover, it may be fiscally unsustainable.  As Elek,
Hill and Tabor (1993: 763) observe in the context of tax concessions to the garments
industry, ‘[i]f, as is likely, the relative share of export firms in the economy continues
to expand, then it will become increasingly difficult to finance the physical infrastruc-
ture they need, or to assure an adequate supply of skill unless they make a contribution-
-through taxes--to the cost of providing them’.  Clearly, the newly elected Fiji Labour
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Party-led government will have to undertake a major rethink of economic policy in or-
der to boost investment.
v. The next decade
The need to boost investment is also a priority because of the major challenges
facing Fiji’s economy in the next decade.  Under the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on
Agriculture, the market access provisions of the Sugar Protocol were locked into the
tariff schedules inspected and agreed by all signatories to the Agreement and subse-
quently all members of the WTO.  The Agreement did not however make specific pro-
visions in favour of Fiji.  This means that the main continued benefit of the Protocol
lies in its quota allocations and the price it offers for Fiji’s sugar.  However, it is likely
that after 1999 there will be major downward pressure on the EU’s internal sugar price,
and thus the price received by Fiji for its sugar, as a result of two factors.  The first is
the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, which is becoming increasingly
likely.  The second is the next round of WTO-initiated multilateral trade negotiations in
agricultural products, which under the terms of the Agreement on Agriculture are due
to begin in 1999 and are thus likely to be launched in Seattle.  These negotiations ‘will
set in train a more powerful impetus to change than may at first sight seem obvious’
(Roberts, 1996: 6).  Negotiations
can be expected to broadly follow the lines of the Uruguay Round:  further re-
ductions of support, increases in market access (eg through further reduction
of tariffs and tariff equivalents) and further reduction in export subsidies and
subsidized export quantities (Roberts, 1996: 5).
Downward pressures on the sugar price received by Fiji will only be reinforced
if, in the negotiations to construct a successor arrangement to the Lomé convention,
negotiations that commenced in 1998, Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade is more strictly interpreted.  A stricter interpretation is probable, in an effort
to achieve WTO-consistency.  The implication of Article 24 is that the successor ar-
rangement would have to move towards free trade over a specified time period and in-
clude all significant economic sectors, including sugar (Prasad and Akram-Lodhi,
1998).  If such were to be the case, the Sugar Protocol would become redundant, and
would, in all probability, be scrapped, an outcome which would represent a severe eco-
nomic shock to Fiji.
In addition, it is likely that SPARTECA will be revised over the course of the
next decade, in part because Fiji has been seeking a bilateral agreement with Australia
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which strengthens its access into the dominant economy in the region, and in part be-
cause Australia has been considering enhancing its trade-based assistance.  However,
new agreements might not be as beneficial as might be thought.  Australia and Fiji are
both members of the WTO and thus agreements covering their trading relationships
must be consistent with the rules of the WTO, and in particular Article 24.  This implies
that any revised agreements would have, as a final outcome, free trade over a specified
time period, which would exclude no significant economic sector.  It is difficult to en-
visage the circumstances under which an economy as small as Fiji’s could avoid the
trade-reducing impact of Australia’s absolute advantage.
3. A THREE-GAP MODELv
As has been demonstrated in Section II, domestic investment, foreign resources
and government resources have all played a major part in Fiji’s economic performance
since independence.  Clearly, economic performance has, in the aggregate, not been
good, especially in the 1990s.  Thus, the low growth, export-driven, fiscally weak, im-
port-dependent economy of Fiji faces major challenges over the medium-term.  There
is in particular an urgent need for the new government to improve the share of invest-
ment in the economy if the poor economic performance of the 1990s is not to be repli-
cated.  In order to assess the significance of the level of government resources and for-
eign resources, as well as domestic savings, on the growth path of output and invest-
ment in Fiji, in this section a structural three-gap model of growth along the lines sug-
gested by Fanelli, Frenkel and Winograd (1987), Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1991) is
specified and estimated.
The three-gap model provides a general framework by which to assess the role
and significance of domestic private and public sector saving, as well as foreign saving,
on the growth path of output and investment.  It might be thought that the rapid growth
in exports, improvements in the trade position, and declining external debt levels dem-
onstrated in Section II make the emphasis on the foreign exchange constraint uncon-
vincing in the case of Fiji.  However, Section II also demonstrated that the growth in
exports and in foreign direct investment has recently slowed down, and thus that the
foreign exchange constraint is more binding than was the case in the early 1990s.
Moreover, Fiji’s main trading partners are forecast to grow at lower rates than was pre-
viously the case, indicating that the foreign exchange constraint will continue to tighten
in the short- and medium-term.  At the same time, the three-gap model explicitly con-
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siders the interaction between capacity expansion and capacity utilization, a specifica-
tion which may be more suitable to countries such as Fiji where the full utilization of
existing capacity is constrained by the kinds of structural bottlenecks illustrated in Sec-
tion II.  Finally, the three-gap model has minimal data requirements for both estimation
and simulation.  These three features make the three-gap model a more suitable means
of understanding macroeconomic growth processes than that provided by other open
economy macroeconomic models.  Granted, the three-gap model is a highly aggregated
one-sector growth model in which price variations, including exchange rate variations,
are not explicitly incorporated.  Although it is possible to incorporate absolute prices
into the three-gap model (Solimano, 1993), it is not yet possible to incorporate relative
prices.  This obvious limitation of the three-gap model should however be weighed
against the already-mentioned benefits of the model.  At the same time, the use of the
three-gap model for understanding economies under adjustment is limited by the as-
sumption that the structure of the economy is not changing.  It should be noted though
that this shortcoming is not particular to the three-gap model; most open economy mac-
roeconomic models suffer from the same shortcoming.
According to the three-gap model, the utilization and expansion of existing pro-
ductive capacity is constrained not only by domestic and foreign savings, as was ini-
tially discussed by Chenery and Strout (1966) in the context of the two-gap model, but
also by the impact of fiscal limitations on government spending and thus on its public
investment choices.  In the absence of well-developed financial markets, the available
methods of financing public investment are mostly confined to foreign borrowing,
budget surpluses and inflation.  Foreign resources can play a particularly significant
role, especially if cutting current expenditures and inflation-based financing are not
possible, either due to political circumstances or to external pressures on the fiscal
authorities to curtail inflation.
The model’s formulation is presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.  All variables
in the model are defined as a percentage of potential output (Q), which was estimated
by passing a linear line through output peaks for the period between 1971 and 1996.
Equation (1) defines real output (X) as the sum of gross domestic product (GDP) and
real intermediate imports (Mk)vi.  Capacity utilization (u) is defined by equation (2) as a
ratio of output (X) over potential output (Q).  The rationale for working with (X) and
(Q) as separate variables is that many developing economies often operate at less than
full capacity, mainly as a result of the unavailability of foreign exchange and other
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structural bottlenecks.  The capacity utilization rate, then, allows an exploration of the
way the three gaps interact in the process of economic growth.
Output growth is determined along Harrod-Domar lines, according to which the
rate of growth of potential output (g) is specified in equation (3) as a linear function of
the investment rate (i), which is in turn defined as investment as a percentage of poten-
tial output.  The parameter (k) denotes the incremental output-capital ratio, while (go)
denotes other factors affecting the rate of growth of output, such as labour productivity
growth.  Equation (4) states the equilibrium condition, or savings constraint, according
to which investment (i) is equal to savings (s).  Total investment in equation (5) is
specified as the sum of private investment (ip) and government investment (ig), with
government investment defined as excluding investment by state-owned enterprises.
Equation (6) specifies total savings as consisting of private saving (sp)vii, public sector
saving (sg) and foreign saving (sf).  Private investment is defined in equation (7).  It is
assumed that private investment varies with changes in demand conditions, as meas-
ured by (u), and with government investment.  Private sector investment can vary posi-
tively with government investment, a so-called ‘crowding-in’ effect, or negatively with
government investment, a so-called ‘crowding out’ effect, depending on whether these
two types of investment are complements or substitutes.  Private savings are defined in
equation (8) and are specified in a standard way, according to which savings are as-
sumed to vary positively with the capacity utilization variable (u).
Public sector savings, investment and borrowing requirements are explained by
equation (9) through (11).  Public sector savings are defined in equation (9) as the dif-
ference between the fiscal effort variable (z) and interest payments on the government’s
foreign debt (ζj*), where (j*) denotes interest payments on foreign debt and (ζ) the gov-
ernment’s share.  In equation (10) the variable (z) defines the fiscal effort rate, also
known as the public sector operating surplus, as the difference between current revenue
net of transfers and subsidies plus the operating surpluses of public enterprises less
government consumption expenditures and interest payments on the public sector’s
domestic debt.  According to equation (10), the public sector operating surplus is as-
sumed to be primarily determined by the capacity utilization rate (u), in that taxes, sur-
pluses from public enterprises, and other receipts rise more rapidly than current spend-
ing when economic activity goes up.  The strength of this response is measured by the
parameter (z1), the marginal fiscal effort rate.  In addition to the rate of capacity utiliza-
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tion, the fiscal effort rate is influenced by other factors such as size of the tax base and
the effectiveness of tax collection system.  The strength of these other factors is cap-
tured by the parameter (zo).  Equation (11) defines the public sector borrowing re-
quirement (πu), or the public sector saving constraint, as the difference between gov-
ernment investment (ig) and public sector saving (sg).  Note that in equation (11) the
public sector borrowing requirement (π) is measured as a proportion of output (X),
while (πu) denotes the public sector borrowing requirement as a percentage of potential
output (Q).
The external sector is summarized by equation (12) through (14).  The import
demand for intermediate goods (mk) is specified as a function of the capacity utilization
rate (u) in equation (12), while import demand for capital goods (mz) is specified as a
function of domestic investment (i) in equation (13).  Equation (14) defines foreign
savings, or the balance of payments constraint.  The first part of equation (14) defines
the current account deficit as competitive imports (m) plus intermediate imports (mk)
plus capital goods imports (mz) plus interest payments on foreign debt (j*) less exports
(e).  The capital account is presented in the second part of equation (14), where (δ)
denotes changes in the ratio of foreign debt over potential output, (δ) denotes the ratio
of foreign debt over potential output, (g) is the growth rate, (r) the ratio of other capital
inflows--such as foreign direct investment--over potential output, and (φ) total capital
inflows as a percentage of potential output.  Exports and capital inflows are treated as
exogenous variables.
The growth-investment equation, the savings gap equation, the foreign ex-
change gap equation, and the public sector savings gap equation are obtained from
equations (1) through (14) and are presented as equations (15) through (18)viii.   In
equation (15), government investment (ig) and the capacity utilization rate (u) are
treated as variables which can be traded off to give macroeconomic equilibrium,
meaning that the growth rate of capacity output (g) can be treated as a target policy
variable.  Indeed, as explained above, one of the innovative features of the three-gap
model is its explicit consideration of the interaction between capacity expansion and
capacity utilization.  This specification of growth, which is consistent with the work of
Taylor and others, may be more relevant in circumstances where structural and foreign
exchange bottlenecks prevent the full utilization of existing capacity.  Equation (15)
thus relates government investment (ig) to the capacity utilization rate (u) and targeted
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potential output growth ( g ).  The savings gap equation (16) gives the maximum gov-
ernment investment attainable from a given rate of capacity utilization (u) that satisfies
the equilibrium condition defined in equation (4).  Assuming that government and pri-
vate investment are complimentary, higher total government investment increases pri-
vate investment and capacity utilization, thereby generating sufficient savings to fi-
nance the higher investment.  Moreover, even if total government investment crowds
out private investment, as long as the crowding out effect is incomplete higher govern-
ment investment will increase capacity utilization.  According to the foreign savings
gap equation (17), there is a trade off between government investment (ig) and the ca-
pacity utilization rate (u).  Higher capacity utilization generates a higher demand for
intermediate imports that can only be met, given available foreign exchange, by cutting
into capital goods imports and hence by lowering the growth rate of capacity.  Lastly,
the fiscal gap equation (18) shows government investment (ig) and the capacity utiliza-
tion rate (u) to move together as higher capacity utilization generates more net fiscal
revenue that can be channeled into capital formation.
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
The model specified in Table 2 was estimated using annual data for the period
between 1971 and 1996 and using an ordinary least-squares techniqueix.  Since capacity
utilization (u) is estimated separately, simultaneity does not pose any problem.  The
results of the estimated behavioural equations are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix.
However, the parameter estimates presented in Table 3, as well as the simulation results
presented in Table 4 in the Appendix, should be treated as highly tentative.  The model
specified in Table 2 is, as already noted, a highly aggregated one-sector growth model
in which price variations are not explicitly incorporated.  Projected growth rates are in
particular very sensitive to changes in world sugar prices and the performance of Fiji’s
non-sugar exports.  Finally, and obviously, the quality of the data can always be better.
i. Structural equations, three-gap results and policy implications
Considering first the private investment equation presented in Table 3, the esti-
mates generated by equation (7) suggest that both the capacity utilization rate and gov-
ernment investment are statistically significant determinants of private investment, ex-
plaining altogether about 95 per cent of the variation in the private investment rate.
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However, the estimated coefficient of government investment suggests that higher gov-
ernment investment tends to crowd out private investment.  It should be noted that such
crowding out need not be detrimental to the economy.  The impact of crowding out on
the economy would depend upon the extent of crowding out, and the relative produc-
tivity of government and private investment.  With an estimated coefficient of 0.547,
the results indicate that the crowding out effect is incomplete, while the results do not
convey any information about relative productivity.
The capacity utilization variable also appears to be a statistically significant de-
terminant of private saving, fiscal effort and intermediate imports.  Thus, the greater the
degree of productive activity in the economy, the greater the rate of private savings,
which can be used to finance investment, the greater the rate of government revenue
collection, and the greater the rate of imports which are used as inputs in productive
activity.  It can be noted that the marginal fiscal effort rate is considerably smaller than
that reported for other middle-income countries (Taylor, 1993: Table 2.3).  It can also
be noted that the estimates for intermediate imports indicate a high degree of depend-
ence on imports.  Finally, the estimates for imports of capital goods demonstrate that
the marginal propensity to import with respect to fixed capital formation is statistically
significant.  It is also relatively large, indicating Fiji’s high degree of dependence on
imported capital goods.  Thus, the greater the rate of investment the greater the extent
of capital goods imports.
Using the estimated values of the parameters and the values of the exogenous
variables, the model was calibrated for 1996.  The resulting three-gap equations are
shown in Table 3 and visually displayed in Figure 1 in the Appendix.  Figure 1 demon-
strates a sharp trade-off between government investment--which is to say, publicly
funded capacity creation--and capacity utilization under the foreign exchange con-
straint.  The savings constraint line is positive, as the stability condition of equation (4)
is satisfied, and is steeper than the fiscal constraint line.  This indicates that government
budgetary constraints are more binding than the savings constraint as more foreign
capital becomes available.  In such circumstances, an attempt to raise government in-
vestment in order to stimulate economic growth will put the government in fiscal diffi-
culties, even though savings are in principle available to finance additional investment.
The fiscal limitations on the government, as well as the crowding out effect of
government investment, should be interpreted with a great care. This is because of the
highly aggregated nature of the model.  Nonetheless, two possible explanations for
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these results can be suggested.  The first is more ‘economistic’, in that it seeks to ex-
plain why government investment ‘crowds out’ private investment.  The crowding out
effect of government investment might be explained, amongst other factors, by the
government’s low savings rate, its massive budgetary appropriations to public enter-
prisesx, and the preferential access to commercial credit that has been granted to public
enterprises.  At the same time, the government’s increasing use of tax holidays to at-
tract both domestic and foreign investment into the export sector, and most notably the
garments, tourism and minerals sectors, when considered in light of a relatively small
marginal fiscal effort rate, may have in fact exacerbated fiscal weakness.  As a conse-
quence, government deficits have had to be primarily financed by domestic borrowing.
However, the financing of chronic government deficits by domestic borrowing has re-
duced private non-financial investment, through a process of crowding out.  There is
therefore a need to recognize the impact of government spending on capacity utiliza-
tion, both in its impact on investment, through the crowding out effect, and in its gen-
eration of savings, through the inefficiency of public enterprises.   In light of these pos-
sible mechanisms, it could be suggested that it is necessary to increase private domestic
and foreign investment in order to enhance capacity creation and its utilization.  This in
turn suggests two policies.  The first deals with the monopolization of domestic savings
by the public sector, and the answer is both clear and orthodox:  much deeper deregula-
tion of the financial sector, primarily through privatization.  The second is consistent
with the policy regime of the 1990s:  the further mobilization of external resources
through the promotion of greater inflows of foreign direct investment.
However, this economistic response is not satisfactory.  This is because it diag-
noses symptoms without giving an understanding of underlying causes.  In order to un-
derstand underlying causes, it is necessary to try and explain why there may be fiscal
limitations on the government and why government intervention in capacity creation
and utilization may be detrimental to Fiji’s economy.  In order to address this broader
issue, it is important to recognize that the state in Fiji through the late 1980s and 1990s
has sought to establish a delicate balance between promoting private sector growth and
safeguarding the interests of its principal constituency, the indigenous Fijian commu-
nity (Elek, Hill and Tabor, 1993).  The pursuit of this balance has been highly contra-
dictory.  Contradictions in the pursuit of this balance may in turn have had economic
consequences.  Recent work on Africa has established ‘strong and specific mechanisms
whereby ethnically fractionalized societies were liable to have worse economic per-
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formance than more homogenous societies’ (Collier, 1998: 12)xi.  This is because eth-
nic fragmentation may be ‘bad for…macroeconomic policy, (local) government per-
formance, public sector wage determination, and the determinants of trust’ (Collier,
1998: 3).  Granted, the negative economic implications of ethnic diversity can be over-
come.  Collier (1998: 12) stresses that ‘political institutions matter more where a soci-
ety has a potential problem of ethnic fractionalization than in homogenous societies.
Democracy has the capacity almost completely to offset the economic damage which
can be done by a high level of fractionalization’.  Nonetheless, ethnic diversity--and
particularly, according to Collier, moderate ethnic diversity of the type experienced in
Fiji--may reduce the efficiency of government in circumstances where there is a lack of
political rights.
There is good reason to suspect that these kinds of mechanisms may have con-
tributed to Fiji’s economic performance during the late 1980s and 1990s.  On the one
hand, the state sought to maintain its political base amongst the indigenous Fijian
population by reducing the political rights of the Indo-Fijian community (Akram-
Lodhi, forthcoming).  On the other hand, the state pursued explicit and implicit policies
designed to promote economic affirmative action on behalf of the indigenous Fijian
community.  These policies have expanded the scope of ethnically based patronage
within the state and society, and may have given rise to rent seeking on the part of indi-
viduals.  The collapse of the National Bank of Fiji, discussed in Section II, illustrates
the capacity for rent seeking in post-coup Fiji.  Ethnic preferences in post-coup Fiji
may also have contributed to other inefficiencies in the public sector.  Certainly, ongo-
ing losses at many public enterprises have been acceptable to the state, in part because
of the ‘ethnicization’ of economic policy.  It is thus a reasonable hypothesis that the
‘ethnicization’ of economic policy in Fiji has played a pivotal role in reducing the ef-
fectiveness of the state and has contributed to the creation of circumstances in which
state intervention may be detrimental to the economy.
ii. Simulation results
The estimated model can be used to simulate the effects of alternative policies
by altering the values of individual variables such as the targeted growth rate of output,
investment, exports and imports and then assessing the effect of such a change on the
other variables contained in the model.  In what follows, the model was simulated for
the period between 1997 and 2001.  These simulations were undertaken under four
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growth path ‘scenarios’.  While the first two simulations assume that Fiji’s preferential
access to the EU for its sugar exports will terminate by 2001, scenarios I and II differ in
terms of their underlying export growth rates.  Scenario I follows a rather optimistic
growth path scenario, according to which the gradual elimination of Fiji’s preferential
access to the EU for its sugar is matched by a corresponding and offsetting export di-
versification effort, as a result of which the country’s export earnings remain un-
changed.  This rather optimistic export growth rate is adjusted under simulation II to
reflect the most recent data on Fiji’s non-sugar export performance and the recent slow
down in the economic growth of Fiji’s main trading partners.
Scenarios III and IV explore two quite different and distinctive growth paths:  a
growth rate that is most likely to occur; and a growth rate that meets ‘socially desirable’
ends.  The most likely growth path scenario assumes that Fiji’s preferential access to
the EU remains in place until the end of 2001 and that Fiji’s non-sugar export growth
rate falls considerably short of those rates achieved during the early 1990s.  Thus, Fiji’s
successful achievement in diversifying its exports during the early 1990s is assumed to
come to an end.  This occurs because of the low projected growth rates of Fiji’s East
Asian trading partners, as well as because of the domestic difficulties facing the country
in its transition from the first, comparatively easy, phase of export-led growth to the
next, more difficult, phase, under which the basis of such growth must be deepened in
order for it to be sustained.  Particular domestic issues include that of land leases, as
well as the future evolution of inter-community relations in light of the new Constitu-
tion and the unexpected outcome of the 1999 general elections (Akram-Lodhi, forth-
coming).  By way of contrast, according to the ‘socially desirable growth path scenario
potential output and per capita output are assumed to grow at an average annual rate of
5.2 per cent and 4 per cent respectively.  These rates of growth are almost identical to
those rates achieved by Fiji during the 1970s.  Unlike the first three scenarios, external
resources are assumed to be both available and adequate under growth scenario IV, so
that foreign exchange gaps, if any, can be filled.  The results of these simulations are
summarized in Table 4 in the Appendix.
a. Scenario I:  Successful export diversification
Considering first growth path scenario I, it is necessary to begin by noting that
over the 10 year period between 1985 and 1994 Fiji received a price for its sugar ex-
ports to the EU which was, on average, 65 per cent greater than the world market price.
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This preferential market access provided Fiji with an implicit subsidy amounting to
about 3.5 percent of Fiji’s GDP per year over the period between 1985 and 1994.  The
effect of a gradual elimination of this preferential market access between 1997 and
2001 on economic growth, investment, government revenues and borrowing require-
ments, and imports and external debt depends on the performance of non-sugar exports.
For Fiji to continue to grow at the same rate as the rate of growth of output experienced
in the 1996 base year--3.1 per cent--and with no change in savings and investment ra-
tios and government borrowing requirements, it is projected under scenario I that non-
sugar exports will have to grow at an annual average rate of 3.9 per cent between 1997
and 2001.  This is noted in Table 4.  Higher non-sugar export earnings and moderate
import growth are then projected to produce a small current account surplus, equivalent
to 2.5 per cent of total export earnings, and a reduction in external debt from 5.3 per
cent of exports in 1996 to an average annual rate of 2.9 per cent between 1997 and
2001.  However, this rate of growth of non-sugar exports appears to unattainable, espe-
cially in light of the recent slow down in economic growth in the East Asia and Pacific
region, as well as the exhaustion of the first and easy stage of Fiji’s export diversifica-
tion drive.
b. Scenario II:  Limited export diversification
In growth path scenario II, export growth rates are adjusted downward to reflect
the most recent export performance of Fiji as well as the developments in East Asia.
Using the latest Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development forecasts
for Fiji’s main export markets, and Fiji’s most recent export performance, non-sugar
exports are assumed to grow at an average annual rate of only 1.3 per cent between
1997 and 2001.  It is also assumed that only moderate inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment are available, there is limited access to foreign financing, and there is no change
in Fiji’s external debt to potential output ratio between 1997 and 2001.  Under these
assumptions, imports and output growth will have to be compressed in order to make
do with reduced export earnings and limited capital inflows.  This compression, as re-
flected in the decline in output growth and the capacity utilization rate is, as shown in
Table 4, considerable.  Reduced imports, including imports of capital and intermediate
goods, make the foreign exchange constraint more binding as the gradual elimination of
implicit subsidies under the Sugar Protocol pushes the foreign exchange constraint line
in Figure 1 towards the origin.  Lower export earnings also reduce the maximum
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achievable rate of investment.  As a consequence, actual output and per capita income
are projected to shrink at an average annual rate of 0.3 and 1.5 percent respectively
between 1997 and 2001.  The decline in actual output combined with a slow rate of
growth of potential output lowers the average rate of capacity utilization to 78.6 per
cent, and fixed investment to 7.8 per cent of potential output, over the period between
1997 and 2001.  Although lower capacity utilization reduces government tax revenues,
an increase in the fiscal effort, such as the broadening of the tax base, leaves govern-
ment borrowing requirements almost unchanged--the fiscal effort parameter rises from
0.117 in the base year of 1996 to 0.125 by 2001.
c. Scenario III:  The most likely growth path
Unlike the previous two growth path scenarios, scenario III, the most likely
growth path, assumes Fiji’s preferential market access will remain in place at least until
the end of 2001.  Making similar assumptions about the growth rates of non-sugar ex-
ports and capital inflows as those made under scenario II, the maximum achievable
output and investment growth rates are reported in Table 4.  Low rates of growth of ex-
port earnings, combined with limited capital inflows, are projected to reduce the growth
rate of actual output from 3.1 per cent in 1996 to an average of 1.3 per cent per annum
over the period between 1997 and 2001.  With a population growth rate of about 1.2 per
cent per annum, per capita income remains stagnant over the period.  Fixed capital for-
mation rises slightly, from 8 per cent of potential output in 1996 to 8.5 per cent of po-
tential output over the period between 1997 and 2001.  The small increase in fixed
capital formation reflects an increase in the capacity utilization rate from 81.5 per cent
in 1996 to 82.6 per cent over the period between 1997 and 2001.  This slight increase in
investment is primarily brought about by an increase in government investment, which
rises from 2.2 per cent of potential output in 1996 to 2.6 per cent of potential output
over the period between 1997 and 2001.  However, despite this slight increase in gov-
ernment investment government borrowing requirements decline from 5.4 per cent of
potential output in 1996 to 5 per cent of potential output over the period between 1997
and 2001 as additional public revenue efforts, such as a broadening of the tax base and
improvements in tax collection, are achieved.  Imports of capital and intermediate
goods rise as a result of the increase in both capacity utilization and fixed capital for-
mation.  These higher imports are financed partly by growing export earnings and
partly by moderate capital inflows.  As it has been assumed that there is limited access
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to foreign financing and moderate inflows of direct foreign investment, external debt
and debt service as a percentage of exports remain unchanged over the period between
1997 and 2001.
d. Scenario IV:  The socially desirable growth path
Given Fiji’s low rates of economic growth during the past decade, projected
economic growth under scenario III, the most likely growth path, will fall short of
meeting the population’s expectations and aspirations, as well the growth rates
achieved by Fiji during the 1970s.  Scenario IV examines the implications of a socially
desirable growth path, in which actual output is assumed to grow at an average annual
rate of 5.2 per cent, a rate that was achieved by Fiji in the 1970s.  Potential output is
also assumed to grow at annual average rate of 2 per cent.  These assumptions imply a
steady increase in the capacity utilization rate over the period between 1997 and 2001,
so that by 2001 capacity utilization reaches almost 98 per cent.  Higher capacity utili-
zation, combined with improvements in the socio-political environment, including a
satisfactory resolution of land lease issues, reverse the steady decline in the investment
rate experienced by Fiji during the past decade.  Fixed capital formation rises from 8
per cent of potential output in 1996 to an average rate of 10.8 per cent of potential out-
put per annum in the period between 1997 and 2001, while private investment similarly
rises from 3.5 per cent of potential output in 1996 to 4.3 per cent of potential output
over the period between 1997 and 2001.  It should be noted that these investment rates
fall considerably short of the investment rates achieved by Fiji in the 1970s, and are
hence achievable.  So too is the projected increased in government investment.  Fol-
lowing years of low government investment and the gradual deterioration of physical
infrastructure, government investment rises slightly from 2.2 per cent of potential out-
put in 1996 to an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent over the period between 1997 and
2001.  Higher government investment is partly financed by higher capacity utilization
and partly by additional public revenues--the fiscal effort parameter rises from 0.118 in
1996 to 0.125 in the period between 1997 and 2001 as the tax base is broadened and the
collection of taxes is improved.  As noted in Table 4, these higher tax revenues slightly
reduce government borrowing requirements.  Higher rates of capacity utilization and
investment also increase imports of capital and intermediate goods.  To fill the foreign
exchange gap export earnings are supplemented by a moderate increase in foreign di-
rect investment as well as by an increase in foreign debt.  External debt is projected to
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grow from US$217 million in 1996 to US$431 million by the end of 2001; debt serv-
icing also grows.  However, relative to potential output, this foreign borrowing is not
large, amounting to an average of 17.5 per cent of potential output over the period be-
tween 1997 and 2001.  It is thus sustainable.
iii. The policy implications of the simulation results
The size of the foreign financing gap under all four scenarios illustrates quite
vividly the centrality of the foreign exchange constraint in general, and preferential ac-
cess to the EU sugar market in particular, on the medium-term growth rate.  It thus
helps to explain why the Fiji government has been trying to promote and diversify ex-
ports.  In the absence of compensatory financing a gradual elimination of Fiji’s prefer-
ential market access will considerably reduce output growth and the capacity utilization
rate.  This would have potentially destabilizing consequences.  For a country which has
had a decade of slow growth and deepening economic insecurity, resulting, amongst
other things, from the implementation of an orthodox structural adjustment programme,
low growth in output, investment and capacity utilization are not without their own sig-
nificant socio-economic costs, both in the short and the long run.  Moreover, given the
short-run pain associated with the implementation of an orthodox structural adjustment
programme, these low rates of output and investment growth make it even harder to
sustain the adjustment programme.  Finally, despite the implementation of a new con-
stitution, the ‘ethnicization’ of economic policy may continue to have an effect on the
growth rate.  This rather bleak outcome applies not only to an extreme scenario, such as
scenario II, under which Fiji’s preferential market access for its sugar exports is as-
sumed to end.  It also applies, to some extent, to scenario III, under which Fiji’s prefer-
ential market access is assumed to be maintained until 2001.
Clearly, if a socially desirable growth rate is to be achieved in the short- and
medium-term, there is a need to overcome the two most binding constraints facing the
Fiji economy, namely the foreign exchange constraint and the fiscal constraint.  The
former requires an increase in foreign capital inflows and the latter an improvement in
government savings.  Since increases in concessional aid for a middle-income economy
such as Fiji are unlikely, the newly elected government is left with borrowing on inter-
national markets and attracting foreign direct investment in order to meet the foreign
exchange requirements of a socially desirable growth path.  Borrowing on the interna-
tional market has its own costs, as the recent experience of East Asia clearly indicates.
30
By way of contrast, Fiji has undoubtedly been relatively successful in attracting foreign
direct investment during the adjustment period.  However, the record of the adjustment
period, as is demonstrated in Section II, is that the government sought to attract foreign
direct investment in order to ‘remake’ Fiji into a low-income economy.  Thus, its ex-
port drive has been predicated upon attracting capital into low value-added activities
such as the low-wage, semi-skilled garment industry.  This is clearly the wrong kind of
export diversification, in that it is not based upon Fiji’s comparative advantage.  Fiji’s
comparative advantage surely does not lie in low value-added activities.  Rather, Fiji’s
advantage is its workforce:  well educated and comparatively well skilled.  At the same
time though the country is spatially isolated.  The impact of spatial isolation can how-
ever be offset if Fiji uses the comparative advantage of its workforce to attract foreign
direct investment into skill-intensive, higher value-added activities which are not af-
fected by transport costs.  International knowledge-based and information technology-
utilizing services offer one possibility which could utilize Fiji’s comparatively skilled
labour force and which would not necessarily be affected by Fiji’s spatial isolation.
Data processing is but one example of such services.  Even in these circumstances
though greater care should be paid when seeking to attract international capital into Fiji.
The state should seek to encourage joint ventures with local capital, along the lines en-
couraged in China, Vietnam and India, so that that technology and know-how which is
transferred into the economy is predicated upon deepening the human capital available
to the Fiji economy and as such building competitive advantage.
Clearly, easing the foreign exchange constraint goes beyond attracting foreign
direct investment.  There is a more general need to further diversify exports in a range
of higher value-added activities.  Nonetheless, given the slowdown in the growth of
Fiji’s exports and the poor growth prospects for Fiji’s main trading partners, increasing
the size of private capital inflows does present itself as a means of both easing the for-
eign exchange constraint and possibly meeting the targeted growth rate in the short-
and medium-term.  However, achieving the socially desirable path requires not only an
increase in foreign capital inflows but also an improvement in government savings.
This can be achieved in part by:  redirecting investment, including foreign direct in-
vestment, into higher value-added industries; by raising the fiscal effort rate and the
public sector operating surplus; and by improving the efficiency of government revenue
generation.  Improved efficiency amongst public enterprises requires, amongst other
things, greater market-based autonomy, greater managerial accountability, and a
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stronger link between performance and remuneration.  Improvements in the productiv-
ity and operating surpluses of public enterprises would contribute to improved effi-
ciency in government revenue generation.  So too would the granting of tax conces-
sions more wisely, the broadening of the tax base, and improvements the tax collection
system.  Improvements in the efficiency of tax concessions requires, among other
things, a shift away from the current policy of granting tax concessions across the board
and towards granting them on a case-by-case basis, with the evaluation of each case
based upon the extent to which the concession helps fulfil strategic priorities specified
by the state.
One final point can be made.  It has been hypothesized in this article that the
‘ethnicization’ of economic policy in Fiji may have played a role in reducing the effec-
tiveness of state intervention.  Clearly, more research needs to be done on this issue.
Nonetheless, if ethnicity has reduced the efficiency of resource allocation by the state
there is a clear need to end the ‘ethnicization’ of economic policy in Fiji.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article has been to review Fiji’s macroeconomic perform-
ance and assess the relative significance of foreign exchange, domestic savings, and
public sector resources on Fiji’s economic growth.  Using annual data for the period
between 1971 and 1996 a three-gap model has been formulated and estimated.  The es-
timated foreign exchange gap equation indicates a sharp trade-off between investment,
or capacity creation, and capacity utilization.  The government savings constraint also
appears to be more binding than the savings constraint as more external resources be-
came available.  In such circumstances, attempts to raise government investment in or-
der to stimulate economic growth will put the state in fiscal difficulties even though
savings are in principle available to finance additional investment.
To assess the significance for Fiji of the foreign exchange constraint in general
and Fiji’s preferential access to the EU sugar market in particular the model has been
simulated for the period between 1997 and 2001 under four growth path ‘scenarios’.
The first two growth path scenarios assume that Fiji’s preferential market access to the
EU is eliminated over the period between 1997 and 2001 but differ in their assumptions
concerning the success of export diversification.  The third and fourth growth path sce-
narios assume that Fiji’s preferential market access remains in place until 2001 but dif-
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fer in their assumptions concerning growth in actual output, exports, and capital in-
flows.
The results from the first two scenarios suggest that in the absence of high
growth rates of non-sugar exports, and with an absence of compensatory financing, the
decline in output growth and capacity utilization rates may be so considerable as to be
potentially destabilizing:  the maximum achievable growth rate of per capita income
was found to be -1.5 per cent per year for the period between 1997 and 2001.  Even if
Fiji’s preferential market access were to remain in place until the end of 2001 the re-
sults of the most likely growth path scenario suggest stagnant per capita income over
the period between 1997 and 2001.  Given the short-run pains associated with the im-
plementation of an orthodox structural adjustment program and the slow growth in per
capita income over the past decade, these low rates of output and investment growth
would make it even harder to sustain policy credibility.
However, the results suggest that the external financing required to achieve a
socially desirable growth path is modest, amounting to an average of 17.5 per cent of
potential output over the period between 1997 and 2001.  In addition to a moderate in-
crease in foreign direct investment, foreign debt is projected to grow from US$217
million in 1996 to US$431 by the end of 2001.  The size of the foreign financing gap
under the socially desirable growth path illustrates quite vividly the centrality of the
foreign exchange constraint in general, and preferential market access in particular, on
Fiji’s ability to achieve a modest rate of growth in the medium-term.  Clearly, the
challenge for Fiji's policy makers is to intensify export diversification efforts and to
improve the government savings rate.  The former requires, among other things, a set of
coherent and consistent export promotion efforts directed at utilizing Fiji’s compara-
tively well-educated and skilled workforce and attracting foreign direct investment into
joint ventures in international services.  Such a strategy, focused as it is on higher
value-added activities, might serve to increase the rate of capacity utilization in the
economy and increase the rate of growth of the economy. Export diversification efforts
should, however, be accompanied by an improvement in government savings if a mod-
est rate of growth is to be achieved in the short- and medium-term.  Finally, it has been
suggested in this article that in order to improve the efficiency of state intervention in
the economy, and thus government savings, there may be a need to reduce the ‘ethnici-
zation’ of economic policy.  Clearly, achieving a socially desirable growth path in Fiji
in the medium-term is a major challenge for the new government.
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Hague, The Netherlands.  His e-mail address is: haroon@iss.nl. An earlier version of this paper was pre-
sented to the Economics Research Seminar at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, in May 1999.
Our thanks to Rob Vos, and to an anonymous referee.
ii. Neither the year of the coups, 1987, or the immediate catch-up year of 1988, have been used in calcu-
lating the period averages in this article, in an effort to garner a better understanding of the relative eco-
nomic performance of the Fiji economy under adjustment.  It can be noted that making some alterations
to the years included in the period averages does not shift the direction of change but rather only effects
the magnitude of change, and only then to a small degree.
iii. The following three sub-sections draw heavily on Akram-Lodhi (1996).
iv. Our thanks to John Cameron for pointing this out to us.
v. Less mathematically inclined readers may want to skip this section.
vi. Output is here defined in somewhat non-standard fashion, reflecting the importance of intermediate
imports in production for a developing country such as Fiji.
vii. Private savings (sp) were estimated as a residual from the Keynesian national income identity, which
can be written in normalized form as:        sp = ip + ig - sg + e - m - mk - mz - j*
where other terms are as they are defined in the text.
viii. The growth-investment equation (15) is obtained by substituting the total investment equation (5) into
the growth equation (3) using the private investment equation (7).  The savings gap equation (16) is ob-
tained by substituting equation (7) through (10) and (14) into equation (3).  Substituting equation (12)
and (13) into the foreign savings equation (14) yields the foreign savings gap (17).  Finally, the fiscal gap
(18) is obtained by substituting equation (9) and (10) into equation (11), the public sector borrowing re-
quirement.
ix. Real variables such as GDP, investment, exports and imports, and government expenditures and reve-
nues were obtained from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics Current Economic Statistics (various issues).  All
real variables are measured at 1977 prices.  Balance of payments and foreign debt data were obtained
from the Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review (various issues) and the World Bank’s (1997) Global
Development Finance:  Country Tables.  Capital and intermediate imports data were calculated by the
authors using the import data by SITC as reported in the United Nations International Trade Statistics
Yearbook (various issues).  Our thanks to Kishor Chetty for his help in obtaining certain data from the
Fiji Bureau of Statistics.
x. Budgetary appropriations to public enterprises amounted to about 55 per cent of total public sector
capital expenditure over the period between 1985 and 1990 (Elek, Hill and Tabor, 1993: Table 2).
xi. Our thanks to David Styan for directing us to Collier’s work on ethnicity and economic performance.
Collier’s work builds upon that of W Easterly and R Levine, whose published work in the American
Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics has a great deal of relevance for Fiji.
Table 1:  Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1971-1996
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
                  1971-81        1982-86        1989-92        1993-96           1993 1994 1995 1996
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Growth rates (% per annum):
  Real GDP(constant 1977 factor cost)   5.2   1.3   5.5   2.8  1.2   4.5  2.6  3.1
  Per capita GDP   3.2  -0.7   4.2   1.4 -0.5   2.8  1.3  1.9
  Consumer price index            11.6   5.0   6.4   2.8  5.2   0.6  2.2  3.1
Annual share of GDP (current factor cost):
  Agriculture 25.7 19.4 19.5 20.0 19.8 20.9 19.9 19.4
  Manufacturing 11.5   9.8 11.4 14.8 14.6 15.0 14.8 14.8
  Gross fixed investment 23.2 20.8 14.9 13.5 15.8 12.9 13.0 12.1
     private fixed investment 12.6 11.3   5.6  5.0   5.5   4.9   4.9   5.0 
Government deficits               5.3   6.1   4.4  4.9   6.2   4.0   3.3   5.9
  Net exportsa   -7.4  -2.5   2.5  4.3  -2.8   1.6   9.2   9.2
Annual share of merchandise exports:
  Sugar and molasses 74.5 63.9 40.1 39.3 39.9 38.9 38.9 39.5 
  Garments  n.ab  n.a 19.8 22.6 21.9 21.2 24.2 23.1
External debt (as % of GNP)c             28.6 32.4 21.4 14.0d 20.5 17.0 14.0   --
Mean daily real wage rates (1985 prices):
  ‘all industries’ 13.2 12.4  9.7  9.8e   9.7   9.9   --   --
  ‘manufacturing’ 13.3 12.5  8.4  8.4e   8.3   8.5   --   --
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sources:  see endnote 9.
a Exports of goods and non-factor services less imports of goods and non-factor services   
b Negligible
c At the end of each period
d At the end of 1995
e For the period 1993-94 only
Table 2:  Specification of the three-gap model
___________________________________________________________________________
Real output:                              X = GDP + Mk    (1)
Capacity utilization:                  u = X/Q    (2)
Growth rate:                             g = g0 + κ i ∀ g0; κ>0    (3)
Equilibrium:                             i = s          (4)
Total investment:                     i  = ip + ig    (5)
Total saving:                            s  = sp + sg + sf    (6)
Private investment:                  ip = i0 + α ig + β u ∀ α ;  β>0    (7)
Private saving:                         sp = σ0 + σ1 u ∀ σ0;  0<σ1<1     (8)
Public sector saving:                sg = z - ζj* 0<ζ<1    (9)
Fiscal effort:                            z = z0 + z1 u ∀ z0; z1>0              (10)
Public sector borrowing
    requirements:                        πu = ig - sg  (11)
Intermediate imports:               mk = a0 + a1 u ∀ a0;  0<a1<1   (12)
Capital goods imports:              mz = m0 + m1 i ∀ m0;  0<m1<1  (13)
Foreign saving:                           sf = m + mk + mz + j* - e = φ = δ + δg + r   (14)
Three Gap Equations:
Growth-investment equation:      i g = [1/(1 + α)][( g - g0)/κ - (i0 + β u)]  (15)
Savings gap:        (1 + α) ig - (σ1 + z1 - β) u = z0 - ζj* + σ0 + φ - i0  (16)
Foreign exchange gap: m1(1 + α) ig + [a1 + m1β] u = 
φ - m - j* - m0 - m1i0 - a0 + e                  (17)
Fiscal gap: ig - (π + z1) u = z0 - ζj*      
      (18)
_____________________________________________________________________________

Table 3:  Econometric results of the structural equations and the three-gap equationsa,b
_____________________________________________________________________________
Private investment:c ip = 0.031 + 0.062 u - 0.547 ig 
      (1.31)     (4.46)     (-2.32)      R2 = 0.95
Private saving:             sp =   0.011 + 0.17 u
         (0.71)   (11.08)      R2 = 0.92
Fiscal effort: z = - 0.084 + 0.117 u
       (-2.33)     (2.88)      R2 = 0.42
Import demand:
  intermediate goods mk = - 0.116 + 0.316 u
         (-2.43 )   (5.87)      R2 = 0.72
  capital goodsd mz =  0.101 + 0.39 i             
         (0.44)    (2.29)      R2 = 0.80
Three-gap equations:
Savings gap: ig = - 0.381 + 0.495 u
Fiscal gap: ig = - 0.127 + 0.183 u
Foreign exchange gap: ig = 1.59 - 1.924 u
_____________________________________________________________________________
a t-statistics are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and the coefficients of determination (R2) are adjusted
R2.  All equations were tested and corrected for autocorrelation.  Specifications that included a trend variable where
tested for stationarity.  All variables are nonstationary, while their first differences where stationary.  Consequently,
the dependent and independent variables in the relevant equations are cointegrated, suggesting that the reported
results are not spurious.
b All equations were estimated using a dummy variable representing the coup of 1987 and the period under the
Interim Government, 1987 to 1992.  The dummy variable was included to account for the possibility of structural
change, as a consequence of the change in government.  The dummy variable was not statistically significant in any
equations, and hence is not reported here.  The equations were also estimated without the dummy variable, and the
results were almost identical to those reported in the Table.
c The private investment equation was estimated using annual data for the period 1977 to 1996.  Due to the high
degree of correlation between private investment and potential output, and thus within the numerator and
denominator of the dependent variable (ip), a degree of correlation which considerably reduces the degree of
variation within the dependent variable, the private investment equation was estimated using the level of private
investment and actual output rather than their normalized ratios.  Note however that the slope coefficients are the
same regardless of whether ratios or levels are used in the regression.  Testing for stationarity suggests that the results
are not spurious.  Both current and lagged values of public sector investment were included in estimating the private
investment equations, as the literature suggests that government investment may affect private investment with a lag.
 The lagged values were however not statistically significant, and are therefore not reported here.
d Due to the high degree of correlation between capital goods and imports and potential output, and thus within the
numerator and denominator of the dependent variable (mz), a degree of correlation which considerably reduces the
degree of variation within the dependent variable, the equation for capital goods imports was estimated using the
level of imports and investment rather than their normalized ratios.  Note however that the slope coefficients are the
same regardless of whether ratios or levels are used in the regression.  Testing for stationarity suggests that the results
are not spurious.
Table 4:  Projected Growth Path Scenarios, 1997-2001
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
                               Growth path scenarios
                  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    End of Sugar Protocol
                                                                      Base year          ----------------------------       Most likely    Socially    
                                                                                                                                                                 desirable
                                                                         (1996)                I                     II  III                    IV
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Real growth rate (% per annum):
  Actual GDP    3.1          3.1     -0.3   1.3        5.2
  Per capita GDP    1.9          1.9     -1.5   0.1        4.0
  Potential GDP    1.3          3.1      0.9   0.9        2.0
  Imports             7.7          1.9     -0.5   1.3        4.2
  Exports                       15.5          3.9a      1.3a   1.1        1.1
                                         As % of potential GDP
                                            (period average)   
  Actual output
  (capacity utilization rate)             81.5        81.5     78.6  82.6       89.5
  Fixed investment             8.0          8.0       7.8        8.5       10.8
  Govt. borrowing requirements         5.4          5.4       5.4     5.0         4.7
                                      As % of exports
                                     (period average)
  Imports           97.7        97.7     98.1           100.6     107.3
  External debt                      17.0        10.3     17.0 17.0       24.5
  Debt services                        5.3          2.9       5.3     5.3       11.3
______________________________________________________________________________
a Non-sugar exports only
45
Figure 1:  Foreign exchange, saving, and fiscal gaps
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